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2What do we do
• Assess Middleware: Make cloud/grid 
software more secure
• Train: We teach tutorials for users, 
developers, sys admins, and managers
• Research: Make in-depth assessments 




2001: “Playing Inside the Black Box” paper, first demonstration 
of hijacking processes in the Cloud.
2004: First formal funding from US NSF.
2004: First assessment activity, based on Condor, and started 
development of our methodology (FPVA).
2006: Start of joint effort between UW and UAB.
2006: Taught first tutorial at San Diego Supercomputer Center.
2007: First NATO funding, jointly to UAB, UW, and Ben Gurion
University.
2008: First authoritative study of automated code analysis tools.
2009: Published detailed report on our FPVA methodology.
2009: U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security funding support.




Condor, University of Wisconsin
Batch queuing workload management system
15 vulnerabilities 600 KLOC of C and C++
Google Chrome, Google
Web browser
1 vulnerability 2396 KLOC of C and C++
MyProxy, NCSA
Credential Management System
5 vulnerabilities 25 KLOC of C
Wireshark, wireshark.org
Network Protocol Analyzer 
2 vulnerabilities 2400 KLOC of C
Gratia Condor Probe, FNAL and Open Science Grid
Feeds Condor Usage into Gratia Accounting System
3 vulnerabilities 1.7 KLOC of Perl and Bash
VOMS Admin, INFN
Web management interface to VOMS data   
4 vulnerabilities 35 KLOC of Java and PHP
5Overview
• Some basics and terminology
• Thinking like an attacker
– “Owning the bits”
• Thinking like an analyst
– A brief overview of in-depth vulnerability 
assessment
• Thinking like a programmer/designer
– Secure programming techniques
6Basics & Terminology
• Have a common vocabulary.
• “Language shapes thought". 
7What is Software Security?
› Software security means protecting 
software against malicious attacks 
and other risks.
› Security is necessary to provide 
availability, confidentiality, and 
integrity. 
8What is a Vulnerability?
“A vulnerability is a defect or weakness in 
system security procedures, design, 
implementation, or internal controls that can 
be exercised and result in a security breach 
or violation of security policy.”
- Gary McGraw, Software Security
9What is a Vulnerability?
A weakness allowing a principal (e.g. a user) to 
gain access to or influence a system beyond the 
intended rights.
– Unauthorized user can gain access.
– Authorized user can: 
• gain unintended privileges – e.g. root or admin.
• damage a system.
• gain unintended access to data or information.
• delete or change another user’s data.
• impersonate another user.
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What is a Weakness
(or Defect or Bug)?
“Software bugs are errors, mistakes, or 
oversights in programs that result in 
unexpected and typically undesirable behavior.”
The Art of Software Security Assessment
› Vulnerabilities are a subset of weaknesses. 
› Almost all software analysis tools find 
weaknesses not vulnerabilities.
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What is an Exploit?
“The process of attacking a vulnerability in a 
program is called exploiting.”
The Art of Software Security Assessment
› Exploit: The attack can come from a program 
or script.
12
Cost of Insufficient Security




– Information and 
data.













“Defense Against the Dark Arts”
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Learn to Think Like an Attacker
14
The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (her, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{







return ((struct table *) 0);
An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
Exploit, redefined:
– A manipulation of a program’s internal state in a way 
not anticipated (or desired) by the programmer.
Start at the user’s entry point to the program: the 
attack surface:
– Network input buffer
– Field in a form
– Line in an input file
– Environment variable
– Program option
– Entry in a database
– … 
Attack surface: the set of points in the program’s 
interface that can be controlled by the user.
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An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
Follow the data and control flow through the 
program, observing what state you can control:
– Control flow: what branching and calling paths are 
affected by the data originating at the attack surface?
– Data flow: what variables have all or part of their value 
determined by data originating at the attack surface?
Sometimes it’s a combination:




val is dependent on inputbuffer[1] even though it’s 
not directly assigned.
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The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (her, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{







return ((struct table *) 0);
An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
The goal is to end up at points in the program 
where the attacker can override the intended 
purpose. These points are the impact surface:
– Unconstrained execution (e.g., exec’ing a shell)
– Privilege escalation
– Inappropriate access to a resource
– Acting as an imposter
– Forwarding an attack
– Revealing confidential information
– … 
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The Path of an Attack
p = requesttable;
while (p != (struct table *)0)
{
if (p->entrytype == PEER_MEET)
{
found = (!(strcmp (buf, p->me)) &&
!(strcmp (me, p->her)));
}
else if (p->entrytype == PUTSERVER)
{







return ((struct table *) 0);
buffer[100]
<ret addr>















An Exploit through the Eyes of an Attacker
The stack smashing example is a simple and 
obvious one:
– The input directly modified the target internal state...
... no dependence on complex control or data flows.
– The attacker owned all the target bits, so had complete 
control over the destination address.
– No randomization
– No internal consistency checks
– No modern OS memory protection
– No timing issues or races
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Evaluation: Finding Bits to Own
So, how do you find vulnerabilities in the face of these 
complexities?
– Complex flows:
• Taint analysis: execute program in special simulation that 
tracks data from input buffers through execution, marking all 
the data and control-flow decisions affected by the data.
• Fuzz testing: using unstructured or partially structured 
random input to try to crash the program.
Reliability is the foundation of security.
We’ll talk more about fuzzing towards the end of the class.
– Randomness:
• Repeated attempts: Sometimes patience is all that you need.
• Grooming: A sequence of operations that bring the program to 
a known state, e.g.:
– Cause a library to be loaded at a known address.
– Cause the heap to start allocating at a know address.
– Heap sprays: repeated patterns of code/data written to the heap so that at 




bpm1 Should a include a slide on taint analysis?
Barton P. Miller, 12/4/2012
Thinking Like an Analyst
24
Things That We All Know
› All software has vulnerabilities.
› Critical infrastructure software is 
complex and large.
› Vulnerabilities can be exploited by both 
authorized users and by outsiders.
25
26
Key Issues for Security
› Need independent assessment
– Software engineers have long known 
that testing groups must be 
independent of development groups
› Need an assessment process that is NOT 
based on known vulnerabilities
– Such approaches will not find new 
types and variations of attacks
27
Key Issues for Security
› Automated Analysis Tools have Serious 
Limitations:
– While they help find some local errors, 
they
• MISS significant vulnerabilities (false 
negatives)
• Produce voluminous reports (false 
positives)
› Programmers must be security-aware
– Designing for security and the use of 




› We must evaluate the security of our code
– The vulnerabilities are there and we 
want to find them first.
› Assessment isn’t cheap
– Automated tools create an illusion of 
security.
› You can’t take shortcuts 
– Even if the development team is good at 
testing, they can’t do an effective 
assessment of their own code.
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Addressing these Issues
› Try First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
– A strategy that focuses on critical 
resources .
– A strategy that is not based on known 
vulnerabilities.
› We need to integrate assessment and 
remediation into the software development 
process.
– We have to be prepared to respond to the 
vulnerabilities we find.
30
First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Understanding the System
Step 1: Architectural Analysis
– Functionality and structure of the 
system, major components (modules, 
threads, processes), communication 
channels. 
– Interactions among components and 
with users.
31
First Principles Vulnerability Assessment





































First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Understanding the System
Step 2: Resource Identification
– Key resources accessed by each component.
– Operations allowed on those resources.
Step 3: Trust & Privilege Analysis
– How resources are protected and who can 
access them.
– Privilege level at which each component runs.
– Trust delegation.
33
First Principles Vulnerability Assessment

































First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Search for Vulnerabilities
Step 4: Component Evaluation
– Examine critical components in depth.
– Guide search using:
Diagrams from steps 1-3.
Knowledge of vulnerabilities.
– Helped by Automated scanning tools (!)
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First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Taking Actions
Step 5:  Dissemination of Results
– Report vulnerabilities.
– Interaction with developers.
– Disclosure of vulnerabilities.
First Principles Vulnerability Assessment
Taking Actions















Discussion of the Practices
• Description of vulnerability







1. Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL 
Command ('SQL Injection') 
2. Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS 
Command ('OS Command Injection') 
3. Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer 
Overflow') 
4. Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation 
('Cross-site Scripting') 
5. Missing Authentication for Critical Function 
6. Missing Authorization 
7. Use of Hard-coded Credentials 
8. Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data 
9. Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type 








– Array access and pointer arithmetic in languages 
without bounds checking
– Off by one errors
– Fixed large buffer sizes (make it big and hope)
– Decoupled buffer pointer and its size
• If size unknown overflows are impossible to detect
• Require synchronization between the two
• Ok if size is implicitly known and every use knows it (hard)
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Buffer Overflow of User Data 
Affecting Flow of Control
char id[8];
int validId = 0;   /* not valid */
gets(id); /* reads "evillogin"*/
/* validId is now 110 decimal */
if (IsValid(id)) validId = 1; /* not true */
if (validId)                  /* is true  */
{DoPrivilegedOp();}   /* gets executed */




\0 \0 \0 \0
id validId
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Buffer Overflow Danger Signs: 
Missing Buffer Size
• gets, getpass, getwd, and scanf family 
(with %s or %[…] specifiers without width)
– Impossible to use correctly: size comes solely 
from user input
– Source of the first (1987) stack smash attack.
– Alternatives:
Unsafe Safer
gets(s) fgets(s, sLen, stdin)
getcwd(s) getwd(s, sLen)
scanf("%s", s) scanf("%100s", s)
60
Buffer Overflow Danger Signs:
• unsafe
– Unverifiable code.
– Compiled with /unsafe flag.
unsafe static void SquarePtrParam(int* p) {
*p *= *p;
}
unsafe static void Main() {
int i = 5;






Some people believe that buffer overflows 
are ancient history  … 
Heartbleed:
• Failure of the OpenSSL library to validate the length field 
(as compared to the size of the actual message).
• The heartbeat protocol is supposed to echo back the data 
sent in the request where the amount is given by the 
payload length.
• Since the length field is not checked, memcpy can read up 
to 64KB of memory.
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
Length field. Supplied by
an untrusted source.




used, and freed.  OK.
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Buffer Overflow
Some people believe that buffer overflows 
are ancient history  … 
Heartbleed:
• Failure of the OpenSSL library to validate the length field 
(as compared to the size of the actual message).
• The heartbeat protocol is supposed to echo back the data 
sent in the request where the amount is given by the 
payload length.
• Since the length field is not checked, memcpy can read up 
to 64KB of memory.
… but they would be wrong.
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Buffer Overflow
Validation to remediate Heartbleed
Read type and payload length
if ((1+2+payload+16)>InputLength)






This is a classic overflow from OpenSSH 3.3.
nresp = packet_get_int();
if (nresp > 0) {
response = xmalloc(nresp*sizeof(char*));




If nresp has the value 1,073,741,824 (0x40000000) and 
sizeof(char*) has a value of 4, then the result of the operation:
nresp * sizeof(char*) = 0x100000000




– Most programming languages allow silent loss 
of integer data without warning due to:
• Overflow
• Truncation
• Signed vs. unsigned representations
– Code may be secure on one platform, but 





atoi, atol, atof, scanf family (with %u, %i, 
%d, %x and %o specifiers)
– Out of range values results in unspecified 
behavior.
– Non-numeric input returns 0.
– Use strtol, strtoul, strtoll, strtoull, 




unchecked to bypass integer overflow control.
const int x = 2147483647;   // Maxint
const int y = 2;
static void UnCheckedMethod() {
int z=0;
unchecked {
z = x * y;
}





checked for integer overflow control.
const int y = 2;
static void CheckedMethod() {
int z=0;
Console.WriteLine(“Enter Integer:");
int x = int.Parse(Console.ReadLine());
try {
z = checked (x * y);
}
catch (System.OverflowException e) {
Console.WriteLine(e.ToString());
}
Console.WriteLine(“Checked output value: {0}", z);
}
Integer Mitigations
• Use correct types, before validation.
• Validate range of data.
• Add code to check for overflow, or use safe 
integer libraries or large integer libraries.
• Not mixing signed and unsigned integers in a 
computation.
• Compiler options for signed integer run-time 
exceptions, and integer warnings.
• Use strtol, strtoul, strtoll, strtoull, 
strtof, strtod, strtold, which allow error 
detection.
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The Cost of Not Checking…
4 Jun 1996:
73
An unchecked 64 bit floating point 
number assigned to a 16 bit integer
Cost: Development cost: $7 billion
Lost rocket and payload $500 million




• Exception are a nonlocal control flow mechanism, 
usually used to propagate  error conditions in 
languages such as Java, C#, C++, Python, and 
Ruby.
try {
// code that generates exception
} catch (Exception e) {
// perform cleanup and error recovery
}
• Common Vulnerabilities include:
– Ignoring (program terminates)
– Suppression (catch, but do not handled)
– Information leaks (sensitive information in error 
messages)
Proper Use of  Exceptions
• Add proper exception handling:
– Handle expected exceptions (i.e. check for errors)
– Don’t suppress:
• Do not catch just to make them go away.
• Recover from the error or rethrow exception.
– Include top level exception handler to avoid exiting:  
catch, log, and restart
• Do not disclose sensitive information in messages:
– Only report non-sensitive data.
– Log sensitive data to secure store, return id of  data.





1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd){
boolean loggedIn = true;






} catch (Exception e) {





2. System grants access Login() returns true
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Unusual or Exceptional 
Conditions Mitigation
boolean Login(String user, String pwd){
boolean loggedIn = true;











2. System does not grant access Login() returns false
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1. User sends malicious data user=“admin”,pwd=null
Exception Suppression
1. User sends malicious data
bool Login(string user, string pwd){
bool loggedIn = true;
string realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
try {
using (MD5 md5Hash = MD5.Create()){
if (!string.Equals(realPwd,





} catch (Exception e) {





2. System grants access Login() returns true
100
Exception Suppression
1. User sends malicious data
bool Login(string user, string pwd){
bool loggedIn = true;
string realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
try {
using (MD5 md5Hash = MD5.Create()){
if (!string.Equals(realPwd,





} catch (Exception e) {





2. System grants access Login() returns true
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Unusual or Exceptional 
Conditions Mitigation
bool Login(string user, string pwd){
bool loggedIn = true;
string realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
try {
using (MD5 md5Hash = MD5.Create()){
if (!string.Equals(realPwd,









}2. System does not grant access Login() returns false102
1. User sends malicious data user=“admin”,pwd=null
Unusual or Exceptional 
Conditions Mitigation
bool Login(string user, string pwd){
bool loggedIn = true;
string realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
try {
using (MD5 md5Hash = MD5.Create()){
if (!string.Equals(realPwd,









}2. System does not grant access Login() returns false103
1. User sends malicious data user=“admin”,pwd=null
WTMI (Way Too Much Info)
104
Login(… user, … pwd)  {
try {
ValidatePwd(user, pwd);







void ValidatePwd(… user, … pwd)
throws BadUser, BadPwd  {
realPwd = GetPwdFromDb(user);
if (realPwd == null)
throw BadUser("user=" + user);
if (!pwd.equals(realPwd))
throw BadPwd("user=" + user
+ " pwd=" + pwd
+ " expected=" + realPwd);
…
Login failed.







User exists Entered pwd
User's actual password ?!?
(passwords aren't hashed)
Reveals internal structure
(libraries used, call structure, 
version information)




raise “Bad passwd for user #{user} expected #{password}”
end
end
def Login(user, password) 
ValidatePwd(user, password);






Bad password for user Elisa expected pwd
["./test3:4:in `ValidatePwd'", "./test3:8:in `Login'", "./test3:15"] 
User exists
User's actual password ?!?
Reveals internal structure





} catch (Exception e) {
logId = LogError(e);  // write exception and return log ID.
print("Login failed, username or password is invalid.\n");
print("Contact support referencing problem id " + logId
+ " if the problem persists");
return;   
}
}
void ValidatePwd(… user, … pwd) throws BadUser, BadPwd  {
realPwdHash = GetPwdHashFromDb(user)
if (realPwdHash == null)
throw BadUser("user=" + HashUser(user));
if (!HashPwd(user, pwd).equals(realPwdHash))





(id links sensitive information)
User and password are hashed









Host A Host B
Network
Serialization Deserialization
ac ed 00 05
74 00 05 54
6f  64 61 79
ac ed 00 05
74 00 05 54








• Protocol for converting objects into a stream of 
bytes to be:
– Stored in a file.
– Transmitted across a network.
• The serialized form contains sufficient 










Python pickle.dumps(…) pickle.loads(…) 
Ruby Marshal.dump(…) Marshal.load(…)










MFC – Microsoft 
Fundation Class
Library
• Derive your Class from CObject.
• Override the Serialize Member Function.
















1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 









1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 
86 ac 95 1d 0b 94 e0 8b  02 00 00 78 70 00 00 00 
01 …








1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 
86 ac 95 1d 0b 94 e0 8b  02 00 00 78 70 00 00 00 
01 …
Class metadata: name, number of  








1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 









1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 
86 ac 95 1d 0b 94 e0 8b  02 00 00 78 70 00 00 00 








1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 
86 ac 95 1d 0b 94 e0 8b  02 00 00 78 70 00 00 00 
01 73 71 00 7e 00 00 00  00 00 02 73 71 00 7e 00 








1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 
86 ac 95 1d 0b 94 e0 8b  02 00 00 78 70 00 00 00 
01 73 71 00 7e 00 00 00  00 00 02 73 71 00 7e 00 








1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 
86 ac 95 1d 0b 94 e0 8b  02 00 00 78 70 00 00 00 
01 73 71 00 7e 00 00 00  00 00 02 73 71 00 7e 00 














1 ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 
86 ac 95 1d 0b 94 e0 8b  02 00 00 78 70 00 00 00 
01 73 71 00 7e 00 00 00  00 00 02 73 71 00 7e 00 
00 00 00 00 03 73 71 00  7e 00 00 00 00 00 04
Original data
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ac ed 00 05 73 72 00 11  6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e 
67 2e 49 6e 74 65 67 65  72 12 e2 a0 a4 f7 81 87 
38 02 00 01 49 00 05 76  61 6c 75 65 78 72 00 10 
6a 61 76 61 2e 6c 61 6e  67 2e 4e 75 6d 62 65 72 
86 ac 95 1d 0b 94 e0 8b  02 00 00 78 70 00 00 00 
01 73 71 00 7e 00 00 00  00 00 02 73 71 00 7e 00 








• Trusting serialized data with questionable 
provenance 
– Attack to the integrity of serialized data.




• Corrupting objects by deserializing untrusted data.
• Security problems.
Successful Command Injection Attack 
via Serialization
1. Client pickles malicious data










2. Server unpickles random data
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Serialization. Remediation
– Prevent serialization if possible, especially of 
sensitive data.
– Write a class-specific serialization method which 
does not write sensitive fields to the serialization 
stream.
– Do not serialize untrusted data.
– Serialized data should be stored securely, protected 
or encrypted.
– Sanitize deserialized data in a temporal object.
– Deserialized data should be treated as untrusted 
input.
Layered, onion-like trust model.  The more you do, the 







– When a program running with a privileged status 
(running as root for instance), creates a process or 
tries to access resources as another user 
• General causes
– Running with elevated privilege
– Not dropping all inheritable process attributes such as 
uid, gid, euid, egid, supplementary groups, open file 
descriptors, root directory, working directory
– not setting close-on-exec on sensitive file descriptors
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Not Dropping Privilege: chroot
• chroot changes the root directory for the 
process, files outside cannot be accessed
• Only root can use chroot
• chdir needs to follow chroot, otherwise 
relative pathnames are not restricted
• Need to recreate all support files used by 
program in new root: /etc, libraries, …
Makes chroot difficult to use.
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Trusted Directory
• A trusted directory is one where only trusted 
users can update the contents of anything in the 
directory or any of its ancestors all the way to the 
root
• A trusted path needs to check all components of 
the path including symbolic links referents for 
trust
• A trusted path is immune to TOCTOU attacks 
from untrusted users
• This is extremely tricky to get right!
• safefile library
– http://www.cs.wisc.edu/mist/safefile




– When user data is used to create a pathname to a file 
system object that is supposed to be restricted to a 
particular set of paths or path prefixes, but which the 
user can circumvent
• General causes
– Not checking for path components that are empty, "."
or ".."
– Not creating the canonical form of the pathname (there 
is an infinite number of distinct strings for the same 
object)
– Not accounting for symbolic links
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Directory Traversal Mitigation
• Use realpath or something similar to 
create canonical pathnames
• Use the canonical pathname when 
comparing filenames or prefixes
• If using prefix matching to check if a path is 
within directory tree, also check that the 





1. Users requests File="....//etc/passwd"
2. Server deletes /etc/passwd
String path = request.getParameter("file");
path = "/safedir/" + path;
// remove ../'s to prevent escaping out of /safedir
Replace(path, "../", "");
File f = new File(path);
f.delete();
Before Replace path = "/safedir/….//etc/passwd"
After Replace path = "/safedir/../etc/passwd"
Moral: Don't try to fix user input, verify and reject instead
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Mitigated Directory Traversal
1. Users requests file=“../etc/passwd”
2. Throws error /safedir/../etc/passwd is invalid
String file = request.getParameter(“file”);
if (file.length() == 0) {
throw new PathTraversalException(file + " is null");
}
File prefix = new File(new File("/safedir").getCanonicalPath());
File path = new File(prefix, file);
if(!path.getAbsolutePath().equals(path.getCanonicalPath())){




• List of (name, value) string pairs
• Available to program to read
• Used by programs, libraries and runtime 
environment to affect program behavior
• Mitigations:
– Clean environment to just safe names & values
– Don’t assume the length of strings
– Avoid PATH, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and other 
variables that are directory lists used to look 







– A string constructed with user input, that is then 
interpreted by another function, where the string is not 
parsed as expected
• Command injection (in a shell)
• Format string attacks (in printf/scanf)
• SQL injection
• Cross-site scripting or XSS (in HTML)
• General causes
– Allowing metacharacters




• User supplied values used in SQL 
command must be validated, quoted, or 
prepared statements must be used
• Signs of vulnerability
– Uses a database mgmt system (DBMS)
– Creates SQL statements at run-time





• Dynamically generated SQL without 
validation or quoting is vulnerable
$u = " '; drop table t --";
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = '$u'");
Database sees two statements:
select * from t where u = ' '; drop table t --'
• Use prepared statements to mitigate
$sth = $dbh->do("select * from t where u = ?", $u);
– SQL statement template and value sent to 
database
– No mismatch between intention and use
Successful SQL Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd)  {
boolean loggedIn = false;
conn = pool.getConnection( );
stmt = conn.createStatement();
rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM members"
+ "WHERE u='" + user





4. System grants access Login() returns true
143
SELECT * FROM members 
WHERE u='admin' AND p='' OR 'x'='x'
2. DB Queried
3. Returns all row of table members
Mitigated SQL Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
boolean Login(String user, String pwd)  {
boolean loggedIn = false;
conn = pool.getConnection( );
PreparedStatement pstmt = conn.prepareStatement(
"SELECT * FROM members WHERE u = ? AND p = ?");
pstmt.setString( 1, user);
pstmt.setString( 2, pwd);




user="admin"; pwd="' OR 'x'='x"
4. System does not grant access Login() returns false
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SELECT * FROM members WHERE u = ?1 AND p = ?2
?1 = "admin" ?2 = "' OR 'x'='x"





• User supplied data used to create a string 
that is the interpreted by command shell such 
as /bin/sh
• Signs of vulnerability
– Use of popen, or system
– exec of a shell such as sh, or csh
– Argument injections, allowing arguments to begin 
with "-" can be dangerous
• Usually done to start another program
– That has no C API
– Out of laziness
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Command Injection Mitigations
• Check user input for metacharacters
• Neutralize those that can’t be eliminated or 
rejected
– replace single quotes with the four characters, '\'', 
and enclose each argument in single quotes
• Use fork, drop privileges and exec for more 
control
• Avoid if at all possible
• Use C API if possible
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Command Argument Injections
• A string formed from user supplied input 
that is used as a command line argument  
to another executable
• Does not attack shell, attacks command line of 
program started by shell
• Need to fully understand command line 
interface
• If value should not be an option
– Make sure it doesn't start with a -





snprintf(cmd, sSize, "/bin/mail -s hi %s", email);
M = popen(cmd, "w");
fputs(userMsg, M);
pclose(M);
• If email is  -I , turns on interactive mode …
• … so can run arbitrary code by if userMsg





– Filename is a tiny language besides opening
• Open files in various modes
• Can start programs
•dup file descriptors
– If $filename is "rm -rf /|", you probably 
won’t like the result





• Vulnerable to shell interpretation
open(C, "$cmd|") open(C, "-|", $cmd)
open(C, "|$cmd") open(C, "|-", $cmd)
`$cmd` qx/$cmd/
system($cmd)





Perl Command Injection 
Examples
• open(CMD, "|/bin/mail -s $sub $to");
– Bad if $to is "badguy@evil.com; rm -rf /"
• open(CMD, “|/bin/mail -s '$sub' '$to'");
– Bad if $to is "badguy@evil.com'; rm -rf /'"
• ($qSub = $sub) =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
($qTo = $to)   =~ s/'/'\\''/g;
open(CMD, "|/bin/mail -s '$qSub' '$qTo'");
– Safe from command injection
• open(cmd, "|-", "/bin/mail", "-s", $sub, $to);
– Safe and simpler: use this whenever possible.
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Eval Injections
• A string formed from user supplied input that is 
used as an argument that is interpreted by the 
language running the code
• Usually allowed in scripting languages such as 
Perl, sh and SQL
• In Perl eval($s) and s/$pat/$replace/ee




Functions prone to injection attacks:
• Kernel.system(os command)
• Kernel.exec(os command)







Functions prone to injection attacks:
• exec() # dynamic execution of Python code
• eval() # returns the value of an expression or    
#  code object
• os.system() # execute a command in a subshell
• os.popen() # open a pipe to/from a command
• execfile() # reads & executes Python script from 
# a file.
• input() # equivalent to eval(raw_input())
• compile() # compile the source string into a code 
#  object that can be executed
Successful OS Injection Attack
1. User sends malicious data
3. System executes nslookup x.com;rm –rf /*
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String rDomainName(String hostname)  {
…
String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname;
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
…
hostname="x.com;rm –rf /*"
2. Application uses nslookup to get DNS records
4. All files possible are deleted
Mitigated OS Injection Attack
3. System returns error "Invalid host name"
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String rDomainName(String hostname)  {
…
if (hostname.matches("[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9.-]*")) {
String cmd = "/usr/bin/nslookup " + hostname);




1. User sends malicious data
hostname="x.com;rm –rf /*"
2. Application uses nslookup only if input validates
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Format String Injections
• User supplied data used to create format strings 
in scanf or printf
• printf(userData) is insecure
– %n can be used to write memory
– large field width values can be used to create a denial 
of service attack
– Safe to use printf("%s", userData) or 
fputs(userData, stdout)
• scanf(userData, …) allows arbitrary writes to 
memory pointed to by stack values
• ISO/IEC 24731 does not allow %n
Code Injection
Cause
– Program generates source code from template
– User supplied data is injected in template
– Failure to neutralized user supplied data
• Proper quoting or escaping
• Only allowing expected data
– Source code compiled and executed
Very dangerous – high consequences for 






print PH "import LogIt\n";w
while (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {
if ($k eq 'name')  {
print PH "LogIt.Name('$v')";
}
2. Perl log processing code – uses Python to do real work
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#














print PH "import LogIt\n";w
while (($k, $v) = (each %data)) {




2. Perl log processing code – use QuotePyString to safely create string literal
name = John Smith
name = ');import os;os.system('evilprog');#




3. Python source executed – 2nd LogIt is now safe
sub QuotePyString {
my $s = shift;
$s =~ s/\\/\\\\/g;   # \ Î \\
$s =~ s/\n/\\n/g;    # NL Î \n












Config file for .NET
XHTML file
WSDL   (web services
description language)
RSS (rich site summary)
SVG (scalable vector graphics)
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XML Injection
• Attack an application 
that parses XML input.
• The processing is 
carried out by a weakly 
configured XML parser.
• The XML parser crashes 
or executes incorrectly 
on the input data.








Two kinds of attacks:
• XML Bombs.
Block of XML that is valid, but crashes the 
program that attempts to parse it.
• XML External Entity (XEE).
Entity replacement values come from 
external URIs causing information 




• Block of XML that is both well-formed and valid.
• Crashes or hangs a program when that program 
attempts to parse it. 

















• Block of XML that is both well-formed and valid.
• Crashes or hangs a program when that program 
attempts to parse it. 

















• Block of XML that is both well-formed and valid.
• Crashes or hangs a program when that program 
attempts to parse it. 

















• Block of XML that is both well-formed and valid.
• Crashes or hangs a program when that program 
attempts to parse it. 













<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>                            http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/ee335713.aspx
Expansion:  A billion “lol”s














• XML bomb attack payload slightly over 200 KB
• Expands to 2.5 GB when parsed
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Mitigated XML Bombs
• Disable inline expansion of entities.




Examples in .NET 4.0:
Disable inline DTDs
XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings();   
settings.DtdProcessing = DtdProcessing.Prohibit; 
XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream, settings);
Limit the size of expanded entities
XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings(); 
settings.ProhibitDtd = false; 
settings.MaxCharactersFromEntities = 1024; 




Disable entity expansion (and limit the size of 
expanded entities):
Disable entity expansion in Ruby’s REXML document
parser.
REXML::Document.entity_expansion_limit = 0 
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XML External Entity (XXE) Attack
• An XML input containing 
a reference to an 
external entity is 
processed by a weakly 
configured XML parser.
• Entity replacement 







• This may lead to the disclosure of confidential 
data, denial of service, port scanning on the 
machine where the parser is located.
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XML External Entity (XXE) Attack
• An XML input containing 
a reference to an 
external entity is 
processed by a weakly 
configured XML parser.
• Entity replacement 






• This may lead to the disclosure of confidential 
data, denial of service, port scanning on the 
machine where the parser is located.
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XML External Entity (XXE) Attack
Accessing a local resource that may not return:
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random" >
Disclosing sensitive information:
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >
XML External Entity (XXE) Attack
Attacker controlled server can cause a DoS:
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://www.attacker.com/dos.ashx" >
public void ProcessRequest(HttpContext context) { 
context.Response.ContentType = "text/plain"; 
byte[] data = new byte[1000000]; 
for (int i = 0; i<data.Length; i++) 
data[i] = (byte)’A’; 







Mitigated XML External Entity
(XXE) Attacks
• Configure the XML parser to avoid resolving 
external references
• If not possible, must modify the XML parser:
– Timeout to prevent infinite delay attacks.
– Limit the amount of data to be retrieved.
– Restrict the XmlResolver from retrieving resources on 
the local host.
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Mitigated XML External Entity
(XXE) Attacks
Example of configuring the XML parser to
avoid resolving external references 
In .NET 4.0:
XmlReaderSettings settings = new XmlReaderSettings(); 
settings.XmlResolver = null; 
XmlReader reader = XmlReader.Create(stream, settings);





Problem: A server trying to determine of the client is 
from an appropriate domain.
Common solution: Look at the IP address for the other 
end of the socket, then do a reverse DNS lookup 
(RARP) on that address.
Risk: The RARP query goes to the server run by the 
owner of the IP address, and they can respond with 
anything they want.
Solution: After doing the RARP lookup, a DNS lookup 
(ARP) on the name returned and see if it matches the 
original IP address.
(All this assumes that you trust DNS in the first place!)
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char *safe_reverse_lookup(struct in_addr *ip)
{
struct hostent *hp;
if ((hp=gethostbyaddr(ip,sizeof *ip AF_INET)) == NULL)
return NULL;
char *name = strdup(hp->h_name);




char **p = hp->h_addr_list;
while (*p) {













Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
• Injection into an HTML page
– HTML tags
– JavaScript code
• Reflected (from URL) or
persistent (stored from prior attacker visit)
• Web application fails to neutralize special characters in 
user supplied data
• Mitigate by preventing or encoding/escaping special 
characters
• Special characters and encoding depends on context
– HTML text
– HTML tag attribute
– HTML URL
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Reflected Cross Site Scripting 
(XSS)
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {










3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code handles request
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Reflected Cross Site Scripting 
(XSS)   
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {










3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code handles request
•••
String query = request.getParameter("q");
if (query != null) {
if (query.matches("^\\w*$"))  {
out.writeln("You searched for:\n" + query);












3. Generated HTML displayed by browser
1. Browser sends request to web server
2. Web server code correctly handles request
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Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
• CSRF is when loading a web pages causes a malicious 
request to another server
• Requests made using URLs or forms (also transmits any 
cookies for the site, such as session or auth cookies)
– http://bank.com/xfer?amt=1000&toAcct=joe HTTP GET method




• Web application fails to distinguish between a user 
initiated request and an attack
• Mitigate by using a large random nonce
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Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
0. User has a session already open with their bank.
1. User loads bad page from web server
– XSS – Fake server
– Bad guy’s server – Compromised server
2. Web browser makes a request to the victim web server 
directed by bad page
– Tags such as 
<img src=‘http://bank.com/xfer?amt=1000&toAcct=evil37’>
– JavaScript
3. Victim web server processes request and assumes 
request from browser is valid
– Session IDs in cookies are automatically sent along
SSL does not help – channel security is not an issue here
Successful CSRF Attack
•••
String id = response.getCookie(“user”);
userAcct = GetAcct(id);









2. evil.com returns HTML
3. Browser sends attack
4. bank.com server code handles request
http://evil.com
1. User visits evil.com
•••
String nonce = (String)session.getAttribute(“nonce”);
String id = response.getCookie(“user”);
if (Utils.isEmpty(nonce)
|| !nonce.equals(getParameter(“nonce”)  {
Login(); // no nonce or bad nonce, force login
return;   //    do NOT perform request
}             // nonce added to all URLs and forms
userAcct = GetAcct(id);




2. evil.com returns HTML
3. Browser sends attack 4. bank.com server code correctly handles request













fwrite($file,$cookie);  // session=sensitive_val
2. Web page  contains a malicious 
link





1. Android activity sets session cookies and loads URL
Mitigated Weak Server Side Control
webView.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient()){
pubic shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView wV, String url){










• Session IDs identify a user’s session in 
web applications.
• Obtaining the session ID allows 
impersonation
• Attack vectors:
– Intercept the traffic that contains the ID value
– Guess a valid ID value (weak randomness)
– Discover other logic flaws in the sessions 
handling process
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Good Session ID Properties
• Hard to guess
– Large entropy (big random number)





• Create new session id after
– Authentication
– switching encryption on
– other attributes indicate a host change (IP address 
change)
• Encrypt to prevent obtaining session ID through 
eavesdropping 
• Expire IDs after short inactivity to limit exposure of 
guessing or reuse of illicitly obtained IDs
• Entropy should be large to prevent guessing




1. An insecure web application accepts and 
reuses a session ID supplied to a login page.
2. Attacker tricked user visits the web site 
using attacker chosen session ID
3. User logs in to the application
4. Application creates a session using attacker 
supplied session ID to identify the user




1. Tricks user to visit












2. User Logs In
http://bank.com/home
Cookie: JSESSIONID=123
4. Impersonates the user
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Mitigated Hijacking Attack











2. User Logs In




(AKA: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site, and Unsafe URL Redirection)
• Description
– Web app redirects user to malicious site chosen 
by attacker
• URL parameter (reflected)
http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com
• Previously stored in a database (persistent)
– User may think they are still at safe site
– Web app uses user supplied data in redirect URL
• Mitigations
– Use white list of tokens that map to acceptable 
redirect URLs
– Present URL and require explicit click to navigate 
to user supplied URLs
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Open Redirect Example
1. User receives phishing e-mail with URL
http://www.bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com
2. User inspects URL, finds hostname valid for 
their bank
3. User clicks on URL
4. Bank’s web server returns a HTTP redirect 
response to malicious site
5. User’s web browser loads the malicious site 
that looks identical to the legitimate one
6. Attacker harvests user’s credentials or other 
information
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Successful Open Redirect Attack
String url = request.getParameter("url");




3. Web server redirects Location: http://evil.com
5. Browser displays forgery
<h1>Welcome to bank.com<h1>
Please enter your PIN ID:
<from action="login">
•••
4. Browser requests http://evil.com
Dear bank.com costumer,
Because of unusual number of invalid login 
attempts...
<a href="http://bank.com/redir?url=http://evil.com">
Sign in to verify</a>




3. bank.com server code correctly handles request
boolean isValidRedirect(String url) {
List<String> validUrls = new ArrayList<String>();
validUrls.add("index");
validUrls.add("login");










1. User receives phishing e-mail
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